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Abstract
This paper shows that job mobility is a valuable channel that employed workers use to mitigate
bad labor market shocks. I estimate a model of wage dynamics jointly with a dynamic model of
employment and job mobility. The key feature of the model is the specification of wage shocks
at the worker-firm match level, for workers can respond to these shocks by changing jobs. I find
that, relative to the variance of individual-level shocks, the variance of match-level shocks is large
and the consequent value of job mobility in reducing the welfare cost of these shocks is substantial,
particularly for workers whose match-specific wages are low. In counterfactual analysis, I show how
the value of job mobility may be affected by search costs and unemployment income.
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1 Introduction
Understanding how much idiosyncratic risk people face and how individuals respond to different types
of risks is important for a number of reasons. There is an extensive literature analyzing individual’s
precautionary behavior under incomplete markets such as savings and labor supply.1 The implications
of these models depend critically on the assessment of the levels of wage risk and the persistence of the
shocks.
In most papers, changes in properly defined wage residuals represent shocks and researchers rely
on the autocovariance structure of these residuals to identify the magnitude of wage risks that are dis-
tinguished by persistence of the shocks.2 With a few exceptions discussed below, most of the existing
literature does not specify sources of wage shocks. Understanding how individuals respond to different
types of risks is important, as government programs (such as unemployment insurance) often insure
against specific sources of shocks to income and can have incentive impacts on individual’s behavior
against risks (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011). In addition, because changes in the wage residuals are ob-
served after individuals’ choices, policy changes that affect individuals’ behavior may potentially affect
the residual wages and the wage risks identified therein. This makes it hard to evaluate government
programs unless we understand how wage dynamics are affected by individual behavior.
This paper aims to advance our understanding of wage risk along two dimensions. First, I distinguish
two types of wage shocks, one type occurring at worker-firm match level and the other occurring at indi-
vidual level, which applies to all firms and matches. The decomposition of wage risk into match-specific
and worker-specific wage risk is economically significant because they have very different implications
to individuals’ behavior and policy. For instance, contrary to shocks at individual level, negative shocks
at match level do not mean permanent depreciation of an individual’s general productivity and may
be recovered by workers through job mobility. Second, by modeling worker’s job mobility decisions in
response to labor market shocks, I show the value of job mobility as a channel of response to match-level
risk facing employed workers and illustrate how it may be affected by alternative policies. The model is
also capable of recovering the true wage risk, defined as the wage risk facing workers prior to their job
1Among others, see Deaton (1992); Carroll (1992); Gourinchas and Parker (2002) (precautionary savings) and Low
(2005) (precautionary labor supply). See Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) for an excellent review.
2See, among others, Abowd and Card (1989); Haider (2001); Baker and Solon (2003); Meghir and Pistaferri (2004);
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008); Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012); Jensen and Shore (2015). More recently, Lochner
and Shin (2014) provide nonparametric identification results for a model of wage dynamics allowing for changes in unob-
served skills.
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mobility choices, which may be quite different from the wage risk inferred from observed wages after
job mobility.
I build and estimate a wage process jointly with a structural dynamic model of job mobility and
employment. The wage process features four independent and linearly additive components: a com-
ponent that is predicted by personal characteristics, an individual component, a match component,
and a measurement error. The match component can be interpreted as job-specific human capital or
idiosyncratic firm effect on wages.3 The match component and individual component follow parallel
stochastic processes: each of them evolves from a permanent shock with a drift. Shocks therefore
represent permanent deviations from the corresponding growth profile. In the structural model, both
unemployed and employed workers search for outside offers with costs. Offer arrival rates depend on
search intensity, which is chosen optimally by individuals. Employed workers make job mobility and
employment decisions following the wage process. They also face an exogenous layoff risk. The model
implies that only the match component is correlated with job mobility choices, which can be used to
separately identify the match component from the individual component in the wage residuals. Similar
to Topel and Ward (1992), I find strong empirical evidence that workers’ mobility decisions are cor-
related with job-specific wage changes in the past. The strong correlation between lagged within-job
wage growth and job mobility is informative of the potential important role of match-level shocks (See
Section 3 for details).
The model is estimated by the Method of Simulated Moments using longitudinal data of young
male workers from the 1996 panel of Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). I find that
wage risk at the match level accounts for the majority of the wage risk facing workers. For instance,
match-level risk can explain 81.9% and 67.5% of the overall variance of wage growth, for low- and
high-education men with 8 years of potential experience, respectively. Individual-level productivity
risk explains no more than 5% of the overall variance of wage growth. The fact that the majority of
wage risk is at worker-firm level has important implications for job mobility and wages. For instance,
it implies that, for certain workers, job mobility can be an important channel to react against negative
wage shocks. Match-level wages are also important in terms of explaining overall wage growth and
inequality over early careers, particularly for low-education individuals and individuals with few years
3Empirically it is infeasible to distinguish pure firm effect from pure worker-firm match effect without employer-
employee matched data. This term is also referred to as match-specific wages or match-level wages throughout the paper.
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of potential experience. Finally, given the large fraction of match-level shocks and the relatively high
rate of job mobility in early careers, the true wage risk is a few times larger than the implied wage risk
ignoring match-level wage shocks.
Counterfactual analysis conducted in this paper further highlights the importance of distinguishing
sources of wage shocks and modeling job mobility behavior against match-level shocks. I find that
the value of job mobility in reducing the welfare cost of negative match-level shocks is substantial,
particularly for workers whose match-specific wages are low. Policies that increase the value of un-
employment tend to reduce the value of job mobility. Relative to job mobility, raising unemployment
income alone provides relatively small reduction to the welfare cost of negative match-level shocks, and
this additional value is largely crowded out when job mobility is available to respond to these shocks.
Therefore, the value of unemployment benefits against match-level shocks could be overstated without
accounting for endogenous job mobility response to shocks.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the welfare value of job mobility
as a mechanism for workers to respond to labor market shocks.4 The value of job mobility in this
context builds upon the premise that job mobility can be affected by match-specific wage fluctuations,
via changes in both reservation wages and search intensity. In a seminal paper, Topel and Ward (1992)
find evidence that previous job-specific wage growth affects workers’ job mobility decisions (holding
the current wage and other observed characteristics fixed). However, they find this result “somewhat
puzzling in light of our previous evidence that within-job wage growth approximates a random walk”
(p.473). This suggests that one needs to estimate a stochastic wage process jointly with a worker’s job
mobility choices, which is the direction taken in this paper.
Two closely related papers, Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2013) and Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri
(2010), make important contributions to the literature by modeling earning dynamics and employment
choices jointly. Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) estimate a wage process incorporating an individual’s
selection process between jobs and into and out of employment. Their estimates suggest that, once job
mobility decisions are controlled for, the variance of permanent shocks is much lower. This suggests that
what has been identified as the permanent wage risk from a typical error component model contains
4The literature has pointed out several other important channels individuals use in response to labor market risk,
including Low (2005) (labor supply), Kaplan (2012) (within family), Blundell and Pistaferri (2003) (means-tested pro-
gram), Gruber (1997) (unemployment insurance), Low and Pistaferri (2010) (disability insurance), and Sanders (2014)
and James et al. (2012) (occupational choice).
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variability due to responses to shocks through job mobility. Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2013)
construct a rich statistical model of earning dynamics from equations governing wage determination,
hours of labor supply, job-to-job transition and transitions into and out of unemployment. They show
that job mobility and unemployment, among other factors, play a key role in determining the variance
of earnings over a career.
The current paper contributes to this line of research in a few dimensions. One important difference
is that both Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2013) and Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) assume that
the worker-firm match component of the wage does not vary over the duration of the job. Within-job
wage changes are assumed independent of a worker’s job mobility decision. Therefore, there is no
match-specific wage risk except the unemployment risk. One key feature of the current paper is to
model wage dynamics within jobs and worker’s selection across jobs and into unemployment. By doing
so, it distinguishes wage risk that is particular to a worker-firm match from wage risk applying to all
jobs. Similarly to Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2013) and Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), I find
that the estimated variance of permanent shocks (from canonical models) is reduced when endogenous
mobility is taken into account and match value is held constant within jobs. However, incorporating
a dynamic process of match within jobs yields a much higher wage risk facing workers prior to job
mobility decisions, mainly from the large estimated match-level risk.
In this paper, the structural model is estimated jointly with the wage process, thereby imposing all
the restrictions from the model on the evolution of the wage process. By contrast, in both Low, Meghir,
and Pistaferri (2010) and Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2013), identification of the wage process relies
on a reduced-form model of endogenous mobility decisions without imposing all the restrictions implied
by a structural model. Although estimating the wage process with selection corrections implied by
reduced-form equations may be attractive in many ways, welfare implications of job mobility and
related counterfactual analysis are best described by a fully-estimated structural model of job mobility.
Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) evaluate welfare implications of different types of risks by using
the pre-estimated wage process from the reduced-form model to calibrate the remaining structural
parameters in a life-cycle model of consumption, labor supply and job mobility. While the model in the
current paper adds to their model in certain dimensions (such as endogenous search intensity, shocks to
match quality which affects job mobility and employment decisions), it does not allow workers to save
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and ignores certain public insurance programs during unemployment. Since an individual’s response
to wage risk will depend partly on the availability of either self-insurance such as savings or public
insurance, the welfare value of job mobility estimated in this paper is likely to be an upper bound.
A few recent papers in the structural job search literature also make important contributions to
understanding wage dynamics, including Yamaguchi (2010), Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010), Bagger,
Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2014) and Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2015).5 These studies use
equilibrium job search model to analyze the wage dynamics implied by the model, emphasizing the
role of firms and wage determination and providing insights on how productivity shocks are translated
to wages. The focus of the current paper is the workers’ endogenous decisions (search intensity, job
mobility, and employment) that translate the process of “offered” wage into realized wages that are
consistent with the structure of the wage data. Relative to the equilibrium search models, the wage
process in this paper is relatively more general, and consequently, the labor market turnover decisions
feature additional heterogeneity and dynamics. For instance, in this paper, the wage process features
heterogeneous worker and match productivity, each of which evolves stochastically with own shocks
and drifts; the structural model also allows for endogenous search intensity and quit to unemployment
following wage shocks.6 More importantly, besides using the model to explain wage dynamics, the
current paper adds to the literature by quantifying the value of job mobility in mitigating negative
match-level shocks and showing how this value may be affected by policy environment. By being
agnostic to firms’ wage policies, one main limitation of the paper is that the job creation and the
offered wage distribution is assumed exogenous and invariant to policy change, which may generate
bias to the counterfactual analysis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the wage process and the dynamic
model of job mobility and employment. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive evidence that
5Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010) focuses on how purely transitory productivity shocks are able to transform into
persistent wage shocks that are consistent with the covariance structures implied in the wage data. The key mechanisms
underlying such transformation are wage renegotiations and on-the-job search. Yamaguchi (2010) estimates a model of
on-the-job search with wage bargaining. He empirically explores the effect of outside option values, match quality, and
human capital accumulation on the wage growth of young workers. Using employer-employee matched data, Bagger,
Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2014) estimate an equilibrium job search model of worker careers, allowing for human
capital accumulation, employer heterogeneity, and individual-level shocks. One important addition of their paper is the
ability to estimate firm heterogeneity using employer-employee matched data. Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2015) develop an
equilibrium model of wage determination and employment that allows for the possibility of assortative matching between
workers and jobs.
6For instance, Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010) ignores the impact of human capital accumulation, and Bagger, Fontaine,
Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2014) only allows for individual-level shocks but not match-level shocks. In both papers,
transitions from employment to unemployment are assumed exogenous.
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motivates this study. Section 4 discusses the estimation and identification strategy. Section 5 presents
estimation results of the main structural model and contrast them to estimates from alternative models
of wage processes. Section 6 discusses implications of the structural model on sources of wage risk and
inequality, as well as presenting the welfare value of job mobility against match-level shocks and how it
might be affected using counterfactual analysis. Section 7 concludes. Additional materials and results
are provided in the Online Appendix available on the journal’s website.
2 The Model
I build a dynamic model of job search, in which an individual makes choices of search intensity, job
mobility and employment. The assumptions of the model are as follows. An individual i maximizes the
expected present value of utility over a finite horizon, subject to a wage process specified below. At the
beginning of each period (t), the individual (either unemployed or employed) chooses search intensity
which then determines the rates of offer arrival. If the individual is employed, he makes the following
discrete choice: move to a different job if an offer arrives, become unemployed, or stay with the current
job. Worker’s acceptance decision of job offers depends on the relative quality of the current match
and the offered match. If the individual is unemployed, he chooses either to become employed (if an
offer arrives) or remain unemployed. This Section begins by presenting the wage process. Details of
the choice structure and decision rules are discussed in Section 2.2.
2.1 The Wage Process
The life-cycle wage process for the individual i employed by firm j in period t is:
ln w˜ijt = lnwijt + vit (1)
lnwijt = β0 + aijt + uit (2)
aijt+1 =

alijt+1, if no job change between t and t+ 1
aoij′t+1, if there is job change between t and t+ 1
alijt+1 = aijt + c+ ηijt+1, a
o
ij′t+1 ∼ N(0, σ2a0) (3)
uit+1 = uit + δ + ζit+1 (4)
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Assume that
ζit ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ), ηijt ∼ N(0, σ2η) (5)
E(vit) = 0, var(vit) = σ
2
v (6)
ui0 ∼ N(0, σ2u0) (7)
with orthogonality between these error terms. ln w˜ijt is the observed real log hourly wage for worker
i employed by firm j in period t and vit is a measurement error (more on the latter below). For an
employed worker, the log wage residual (after taking out the constant term β0) is decomposed into two
components: an individual component uit and a match component aijt between firm j and worker i.
Equations (3) and (4) describe potential (or “offered”) wage in period t+ 1, conditional on the actual
wage in period t (discussed below). All parameters of the wage process are specific to the completed
education level of the individual.
The individual component (uit) measures the worker’s general productivity regardless of his em-
ployer. It evolves over the life-cycle from an identically and independently distributed permanent
random shock ζit and a growth factor δ. σ
2
u0 measures the initial heterogeneity of general productivity.
The individual component corresponds to the concept of permanent wage in the literature, which is
usually thought of as representing return to skill or flow from human capital. δ captures return to work
experience, perhaps through differential learning ability to general skills or human capital investment.7
Parallel to the individual component and prior to selection between jobs, the match component
follows a random walk process with a growth factor. Let alijt+1 be the latent match at t + 1 prior
to job mobility (“l” represents latent). It evolves from a growth factor (drift), c, and a permanent
shock, ηijt, which is identically and independently distributed across firms, workers and time. One
interpretation of the match component is that it is an idiosyncratic firm effect that is complementary
to individual productivity. From the perspective of human capital theory, the match component can
also be regarded as job-specific human capital. The growth factor (c) can be thought of capturing
return to tenure (or firm-specific human capital). The shock to the match component then represents a
7One plausible mechanism that links the growth in the individual-level wage component into wage growth is to assume
that wages are offered based on piece-rate contracts, as in Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2011) and Bagger, Fontaine,
Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2014). In this case, human capital accumulation increase output (via learning-by-doing) and
log wage is a linear combination of the individual human capital, worker-firm match, and contractual piece rate.
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worker-firm specific permanent deviation from the mean growth rate.8 This would happen, for example,
when in a particular year the firm does not provide enough training to enhance the worker’s firm-specific
skills (negative ηijt), or it adopts a new technology that is complementary to the worker’s productivity
(positive ηijt). In general it consists of both a pure match-specific shock and a pure firm-specific shock,
although without firm level data, distinguishing between these is not feasible. More broadly, the match
component can be interpreted as any factor that affects the worker’s productivity with the current
firm but not after he leaves for other firms.9 The growth factor and permanent shocks to the match
component are accumulating only over the current job tenure and will “vanish” after a job destruction.
Match- and individual-specific log wage shocks are assumed to follow normal distributions with zero
means and variances σ2η and σ
2
ζ , respectively.
10.
A job offer with match-specific wage ao (“o” stands for “offer”) is a random draw from a stationary
offer distribution. I assume that it follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2a0 .
Because of the growth profile in the individual-component of wage (due to δ), the mean offered wages
would be shifting with the worker’s labor market experience. Offered matches are assumed uncorrelated
with the worker’s individual wage component, which implies that there is no assortative matching in
the labor market.
When worker i receives an offer from firm j′ at time t, prior to making a job mobility decision,
the worker is perfectly informed of his general productivity (uit), match-specific productivity (a
l
ijt) if
he chooses to stay and the value of the offer (aoij′t).
11 At any time, workers have perfect information
about their current match value, the expectation of future match values, and the distribution of the
8One interesting area to explore is to allow the growth factor to be worker-firm specific, which can generate some very
interesting wage dynamics at job changes because job mobility depends on the combination of wages and its growth rate
(Burdett and Coles (2010)). In the data we are unable to observe the entire wage-tenure profile for a large number of jobs
(in the SIPP data the number of wage observations per person is maximum 12 periods, or 4 years). Therefore, given the
censoring problem, it is difficult to estimate the effects of heterogeneous wage-tenure profile. Note that, if there is a lot
of heterogeneity in the returns to tenure, then part of the match-level shocks defined in this paper may be heterogeneity
and known at the time of job mobility choice. In this case, the estimated match-level risk is likely to be an upper bound.
9Note that the newly accepted match would be positively correlated to the old match because of selection (that workers
only move towards jobs that are more productive than their current job).
10The distribution assumptions are stronger than the standard permanent-transitory decomposition in the literature,
but they are necessary in order to correct for selection bias due to endogenous employment and mobility (See Section 4
for details)
11I abstract from uncertainty about worker productivity and any private and public learning. For instance, Harris
and Holmstrom (1982) and Farber and Gibbons (1996) explore the implications for wage dynamics of the assumptions
that employers learn about the worker productivity over time and information is public; Waldman (1984) and Greenwald
(1986) analyze models in which the incumbent employer has an information advantage. Farber and Gibbons’s result that
employer learning induces a martingale component into the wage process (holding worker productivity is fixed) provides
a structural interpretation of wage dynamics.
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match component in the labor market, but information on other job locations and their associated
match value must be obtained through search. I assume that none of the shocks to the uit and aijt are
anticipated by the worker so they represent wage uncertainty.12
Measurement errors are identically and independently distributed across individuals and over time.
Measurement errors may also capture some transitory wage shocks at either the worker-firm match level
or the person level, although they must affect wages after the mobility decision is made in each period.13
In the canonical decomposition of shocks into transitory and permanent components, transitory shocks
may well be important because of unemployment spells or temporary job spells.14 In the structural
model, these sources of transitory shocks are modeled explicitly through employment and job mobility
decisions. For instance, for the match-level wage process, the distinction between permanent and
transitory is less important; permanent match shocks, albeit permanent from the view of workers, can
be transitory ex-post if job-to-job transitions occur quickly (See Section 6.1 for some evidence).
2.2 The Model of Job Mobility and Employment
Utility function. The baseline utility function is specified as follows:
Uijt = Pit lnwijt + (1− Pit) ln b (8)
The individual’s utility depends on the log wage (ln(wijt)) if he is working (Pit = 1). The log wage
(without measurement errors) evolves subject to the stochastic process specified above. While unem-
ployed, the worker receives a utility flow (ln b) where b includes unemployment benefits.
Intertemporal Optimization Problem. The intertemporal optimization problem can be written
in recursive form using value functions. All individuals begin their lives in the unemployment state
and have a finite horizon denoted by T . Since the decision period is discrete, additional restrictions
are placed on the timing of the events. In particular, it is assumed that the individual is only able
12This excludes the possibility that parts of these random shocks may be known to workers in advance. See Cunha,
Heckman, and Navarro (2005).
13In other words, they are unrelated to job mobility and employment decisions. It is potentially interesting to allow
transitory shocks to affect job mobility and employment, although this would increase the computational burden sub-
stantially. Additionally, we need to assume that workers have perfect information to distinguish transitory shocks from
permanent ones.
14For instance, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) provide some descriptive evidence that job mobility could be the main
contributor to transitory wage shocks.
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to receive a job offer conditional on the current job not being displaced. Search intensity is chosen to
maximize expected utility at the beginning of period t, prior to the realizations of wage shocks in period
t.15 After search intensity is chosen, wage shocks are first realized and the workers make job mobility
decisions based on the new wages. When the individual is displaced, he has to remain unemployed for
at least one period.
Let Si denote the set of state variables summarizing the individual’s permanent characteristics
(such as initial heterogeneity in the wage equation). The value of nonemployment for the individual in
period t is defined by
V nt (uit,Si) = ln b+ Γ max
λnit+1
{
λnit+1Emax
[
V nt+1(uit,Si), V
e
t+1(aijt+1, uit,Si)
]
+ (1− λnit+1)V nt+1(uit,Si)− φn(λnit+1)
}
(9)
where Γ is the discount factor and λnit+1 is the optimal search intensity for the unemployed individual
in period t+1, normalized to equal the job finding rate.16 In periods of nonemployment, the individual
wage component is held constant (i.e. uit = uit+1).
17 V et+1(aijt+1, uit,Si) is the value of employment
if the worker is offered a job with match productivity of aijt+1. φ
n(λnit) defines search costs incurred
during unemployment given the offer arrival rate λnit. It is assumed that the function φ
n(·) is strictly
increasing and convex with φn(0) = 0. The job offer is acceptable to the individual provided that
V et+1(aijt+1, uit,Si) is larger than V
n
t+1(uit,Si).
15This timing restriction is made to reduce computation burden for solving the value function, because we do not need
to integrate out the optimal search intensity when evaluating the continuation value function (see below). It is worth
keeping in mind that shocks are permanent, and therefore, the search intensity in period t + 1 will depend on the shock
in period t.
16Note that λnit+1 (and λ
e
it+1 in the value function of employment below) is not inside the expectation operator because
it is chosen prior to the realization of wage shocks in period t+ 1.
17This assumes away any exogenous depreciation of skills following job loss. Without skill depreciation, unemployment
may lead to wages on reentry being lower either because of selection into unemployment (in terms of the unobservable
characteristics uit) or because the new job will on average have a lower match value.
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The value function of employment with the firm j in period t is given by
V et (aijt, uit,Si)
= ln(wijt) + Γ max
λeit+1
{
λeit+1(1− ρ)Emax
[
V et+1(aijt+1, uit+1,Si), V
e
t+1(aij′t+1, uit+1,Si), V
n
t+1(uit+1,Si)
]
+ (1− λeit+1)(1− ρ)Emax
[
V et+1(aijt+1, uit+1,Si), V
n
t+1(uit+1,Si)
]
+ ρE
[
V nt+1(uit+1,Si)
]− φe(λeit+1)} (10)
where λeit+1 is the optimal job finding rate when the individual is employed and ρ is the exogenous
layoff probability in each period. φe(λeit) defines search costs incurred during employment given the offer
arrival rate λeit. As for the φ
n function, I assume φe(·) is strictly increasing and convex and φe(0) = 0.
Note that the marginal costs of search potentially differ by employment status, reflecting differences
in technology or opportunity costs between on-the-job search and search during unemployment. When
the individual accepts an external offer, his match component will be the match value offered by the
new firm (aij′t+1). The dynamics of state variables aijt and uit follow the wage process specified
previously. For instance, if the individual continues with the same job in the next period, his wage paid
by the current employer then adjusts to a new level to absorb the returns to tenure and experience,
permanent shocks to the individual and match components of wages. The worker may also choose to
quit to unemployment following a large negative shock to either aijt or uit.
Among employed workers, the optimal search intensity, λeit, is determined by the first-order condi-
tion18
∂φe(λeit)
∂λeit
= (1− ρ)Emax [V et (aijt, uit,Si), V et (aij′t, uit,Si), V nt (uit,Si)]
− (1− ρ)Emax [V et (aijt, uit,Si), V nt (uit,Si)] (11)
where the marginal cost of search effort is equated with the marginal benefit of search effort given
by the difference between the optimized values of current job and employment when an external offer
arises. Because the marginal benefit of search declines with match-level wages and the assumption of
increasing marginal cost of effort (holding all else constant), the optimal search intensity declines with
18Search intensity is normalized to equal to job offer arrival rates. This normalization is necessary for estimation of the
model given that search intensity is not directly observed in the data.
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match-level wages while employed.
For unemployed individuals, the optimal search intensity, λnit, is determined by the first-order con-
dition
∂φn(λnit)
∂λnit
= Emax [V nt (uit,Si), V
e
t (aijt, uit,Si)]− V nt (uit,Si) (12)
where the marginal benefit of search effort is given by the difference between the optimized values of em-
ployment and unemployment. The incentive for unemployment search is large for individuals with high
uit, because the expected market wage offered relative to unemployment income is increasing in uit.
19
An increase in unemployment benefits (b) reduces the marginal benefit from search, thereby reducing
the incentive to search for a job when unemployed. This is the moral hazard effect of unemployment
benefits in this model.
Employment and Mobility Decisions. The employment decision can be characterized by a thresh-
old reservation value where the worker is employed if the offered match value is larger than the threshold.
The reservation match, gt(uit,Si), is defined implicitly by:
V nt (uit,Si) = V
e
t (gt(uit,Si), uit,Si)
where the reservation match for employment depends on the individual permanent component and
unobserved type of the individual. It is straightforward to show that gt(uit,Si) is decreasing in uit.
20
Therefore, it is expected that an unemployed individual with a high individual-level wage component has
a shorter spell of unemployment. This condition also implies that employed workers whose individual-
level wages are high have a small probability of quitting to unemployment following a negative match-
level shock.
A job mobility decision can be characterized by a threshold reservation value where the worker
chooses to move if the offered match is larger than the threshold. For a worker currently employed by
19Formally, Mortensen (1986) shows that the optimal search effort increases with the mean of the wage offer distribution.
20Both the values of unemployment and employment are monotonically increasing in uit and, for one unit change in
uit, the value of employment increases more than the value of unemployment.
13
firm j, the reservation match, ht(aijt), is defined implicitly by:
V et (aijt, uit,Si) = V
e
t (ht(aijt), uit,Si)
For a worker of type Si and general productivity uit, the worker chooses to move only if there is an
offer such that aoij′t > ht(aijt). In a standard model of search on the job with utility linear in the wage
and an exogenous wage offer distribution, an employed worker simply accepts any wage that is higher
than his current wage (which is the reservation wage). The new reservation wage after job mobility is
defined by the wage at the new job (e.g. (Burdett, 1978)). In the current model, because the match-
level shocks ηijt are i.i.d across jobs and over time, it simply shifts permanent income and the worker
does not give anything up by accepting a job with a higher match. Therefore, given that the worker
maximizes the present discounted value of log wage, the implied reservation match for job mobility is
simply given by setting ht(aijt) = aijt.
Implications on Wage Risk. There are two implications arising from the model of job mobility.
First, modeling job mobility decisions is important to identify the true wage risk. As an example,
suppose the log wage consists of only the match-specific component subject to permanent shocks.
Figure 1 demonstrates two possible wage dynamics for a given worker. Prior to time t, the wage is a0.
At the beginning of period t, he suffers a permanent negative match-specific shock η, and his new wage
is a1 = a0 − η. The permanent wage drop considered here stems from a pure idiosyncratic firm effect
and does not mean a depreciation of general individual productivity. In the absence of job mobility,
his wage is expected to remain at a1 for the rest of his working life. Now, suppose a job offer valued
ao arrives at t+ 1 (left panel of Figure 1). If the new offer is greater than his reservation match h(a1),
he would switch to the new job and earn a wage rate at a2 = a
o. In this case, the wage increase from
a1 to a2 results from an endogenous job mobility decision rather than the wage shock, a point first
emphasized by Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010). Moreover, by changing jobs, the worker manages
to turn the initial permanent wage shock(η) into one that is effectively partly transitory and partly
permanent. Only for a worker who remains at a1 for a long time is the initial shock correctly identified.
The right panel of Figure 1 depicts a second match dynamic in a similar setting. The only difference is
that the worker is able to locate a better job within period t. If the worker takes the job, the observed
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wage rate in period t becomes a2, which underestimates the magnitude of true wage shocks. The
variance of permanent match-level shocks, σ2η, measures wage risk prior to job mobility. The observed
average wage per period alone mitigates the initial wage risk facing workers, as it is combined with the
worker’s response to latent shocks.
The ex-post (observed) persistence of the shocks and the extent of the latent wage shocks should
depend on how quickly a worker could improve his match by changing jobs. Since the probability of
job changes is inversely related to the quality of the contemporaneous match, the model implies that
match-specific shocks would appear more (less) persistent for workers of higher (lower) match quality.
Therefore, the contribution from permanent shocks on the variance of observed wage changes should
be larger for workers of higher match quality. I provide some evidence for this claim in Section 6.1 of
this paper.
The second insight from the model is that, following a negative match shock, the worker’s reservation
match becomes lower than the reservation match without the shock. There is now a set of wage offers
that are acceptable after the match-level shock which would not have been acceptable without the
match-level shock. On top of that, the optimal search intensity also increases as the marginal benefit
of searching for outside offers becomes greater. This is how job mobility arises as a channel of ex-post
response to wage risk. The value of job mobility depends on how the match-level shock affects the
worker’s job mobility decision, holding the reservation wage fixed at each period. In Section 6.2, I
formally define and quantify job mobility as a means of responding to shocks in the labor market.21
This discussion also highlights the economic importance of modeling the dynamics of the match-specific
wage aj and the person-specific wage u separately. If match quality aj is constant within jobs, then
job mobility would not be a useful channel to counteract wage shocks.
21This can also be thought as the insurance value of job mobility. Note that the welfare value of job mobility considered
here is not the same as shutting down all job mobility, because with random job offers and on-the-job search, there is job
mobility even if workers were not to move because of match shocks. See Section 6.2 for additional discussions.
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3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The data set I exploit is the 1996 panel of Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). It
is a four-year panel comprising 12 interviews (waves). Each wave collects comprehensive information
on demographics, labor market activities and types and amounts of income for each member of the
household over the four-month reference period. There are two main advantages of using the SIPP.
One is that it has a short recall period, making it an ideal data set to study short-term employment
dynamics that are very common among young workers.22 The other advantage is that the SIPP contains
a unique job identification for every job an employed worker had through the sample period. It records
job specific wages and hours at each interview date (every four months), allowing researchers to obtain
the precise wage changes at the time when job transitions take place. These features make it an
attractive data set to study the short-term job mobility and wage dynamics.
The original SIPP 1996 panel has 3,897,177 person-month observations.23 I exclude women, full-
time students, the self-employed, the disabled, those completing fewer than nine interviews and those
who are recalled by a previous employer after a separation. I trim the population whose real wage falls
into the top and bottom 1% of the real wage distribution by wave. I focus on the primary job, which
is defined as the job generating the most earnings in a wave. Although SIPP has monthly information
on job changes and earnings, the time unit in the analysis of this paper is four months (a wave). This
avoids the seam bias if we were using monthly variables. Real monthly earnings and the wage are
derived by deflating the reported monthly earnings and wage by monthly US urban CPI. The reported
hourly wage rate is used whenever the worker is paid by the hour. For these workers, the real wage per
wave is the mean of monthly real wage over the four months. For workers who are not hourly paid,
their real wages are obtained by dividing real earnings by reported hours of labor supply per wave.24
Job change is identified from a change in job ID between waves. If an individual is unemployed through
the wave, no job ID would be assigned.25 In the first wave of SIPP, respondents are asked the starting
22In the selected sample, if a worker is observed to change jobs in a given calendar year, 19% of them would experience
multiple job changes within the same calendar year. This means that job mobility observations at annual frequency
understate the extent of job-to-job transitions by about one-fifth.
23Note that, due to attrition, not all individuals complete 12 interviews.
24For each month, respondents report hours of work per week and how many weeks they worked. Monthly labor supply
is calculated as hours per week×(weeks worked/weeks in month)×4.33
25Fujita and Moscarini (forthcoming) document a substantial amount of recall unemployment in the SIPP data (in
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date of their present job. I use this information to construct correct job tenure for workers with elapsed
job duration when they are first sampled.
I construct two separate panels, one consisting of low-education individuals (those with high school
education) and the other including high-education individuals (those with college education). Each
panel contains individuals aged between 23 and 35 who are observed for eight consecutive waves in the
sample.26 For this group of individuals, job mobility is most frequent and is the most important way
for wage growth in early careers (Topel and Ward, 1992). The final samples consist of 938 men in the
high-education sample and 755 men in the low-education sample.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. Table 2 reports the distribution of the total number
of observed job changes in the sample. The initial life-cycle period refers to the periods of potential
experience observed in the first sample period. Overall, nearly 45% of the workers switch jobs at least
once in the four-year sample period. The extent of job-to-job transitions decreases monotonically with
the potential experience of the individual. For instance, among the most experienced, only 30% of
the individuals made at least one job change within the sample period. In contrast, the majority of
the individuals who recently entered the labor market made at least one job change by the end of the
sample period.
3.2 Wage Growth and Job Mobility: Descriptive Evidence
In this section, I present a set of descriptive evidence addressing the following questions: First, what is
the pattern of within-job wage growth and, in particular, how common are real wage cuts? Second, what
is the empirical relation between within-job wage growth and subsequent job mobility? Are workers
who experience within-job wage cuts more likely to change jobs? The empirical evidence provided in
which a worker is laid off temporally and then hired back by the same firm). It is not possible to separate out recall
unemployment in the SIPP panel used in this paper, because job IDs are reset by default after an entire wave (one quarter)
of unemployment. Nevertheless, the overall rate of unemployment (recall and non-recall unemployment combined) for
the sample of young male workers under study is low. The option of recall unemployment is perhaps more significant in
equilibrium models because it directly affects firms’ incentive to post vacancies (in Fujita and Moscarini (forthcoming),
posting a vacancy is costly whereas recalling a previous worker is costless). From the view of individual workers, regardless
of whether there is a recall, unemployment represents the same underlying phenomenon, that of workers marginal product
being lower than their reservation wage.
26In the SIPP data, the maximum duration that an individual appears in the panel is 4 years. We know that many
18-22 year olds with high school education would be attending college. Given that the panel is not long enough to observe
the highest completed level of education for these individuals, the age range (23-35) is imposed so that people can have
completed college education. In addition, the sample excludes individuals who are full-time students in any wave in the
SIPP panel.
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this section are useful benchmarks to evaluate the assumptions and implications of the model.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of within- and between-job wage growth. The top panel shows
the real wage growth calculated as the change in log real wages every four months.27 Two features
of the picture are clear. First, between-job wage growth has larger variation than within-job wage
growth. Second, both within-job and between-job real wage cuts are very common. Around 45% of
job-to-job transitions end up with wage cuts, and about half of within-job wage growths are negative.
The majority of the within-job wage cuts are small in magnitude. For instance, the median within-job
real wage cut is merely 1.3% per period. There remains, however, a substantial portion of within-job
wage growth showing significant drops. Among the within-job real wage cuts, 25% of those include
wage declines of 12% or more between waves. Wage cuts between jobs are much greater in magnitude:
the median between-job wage decline is close to 20%. The measurement error may be an important
contributor, which is accounted for in the wage process and discussed later. Part of the real wage
change could also be due to the stickiness of wages that are not immediately keeping up with the rising
cost of living. The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution of nominal wage growth between
and within jobs. Nominal wage stickiness implies less than 1 percentage point of decline in real wage
growth on average, which is very small relative to the extent of wage cuts observed in the data. For
instance, the mean quarterly wage growth is 2.17% if real wage is used and 2.84% if nominal wage is
used.28
To understand the empirical relation between wages and a worker’s subsequent mobility choice,
I estimate the following regression using individuals who are employed for at least three consecutive
periods:
Mijt+1 = α1∆ lnwijt + x
′
itα2 + γij + ijt (13)
where Mijt+1 is an indicator variable that is equal to one if an individual i employed by firm j in period t
moves to a new job in period t+1 (and zero if the individual does not switch jobs), ∆ lnwijt is the within-
job wage growth in period t and the vector xit includes a quadratic in worker’s age and year dummies.
27Throughout this section, wage refers to real wage unless noted otherwise.
28The maximum of quarterly increase in the cost of living leads to a 1.53 percent decline in real wages. Note that change
in cost of living will affect both outside offers and incumbent wages and therefore it won’t explain the large between-job
wage cuts relative to within-job wage cuts.
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Worker-job match fixed effects are included to control for any time-invariant unobservables associated
with a worker-job match. For instance, γij may capture the effect of match-specific permanent wages
or permanent wage growth on job mobility. Parameter α1 is the estimated effect of lagged within-job
wage changes on job mobility, holding all the other covariates constant. If match-level shocks affect
future job mobility as implied by our model, the estimated α1 should be negative because worker whose
within-job wage growth is low should be more likely to move to another job in the following period.
If within-job wage changes are completely due to measurement errors or individual-level productivity
shocks, there should be zero correlation between worker’s job mobility choices and within-job wage
change.
Columns (1)-(3) in Table 3 reports the estimates using a linear probability model. In column
(1), equation (13) is estimated without the match fixed effects.29 Columns (2) and (3) build on the
specification in column (1) by adding individual fixed effects and individual-job match fixed effects,
respectively. Because the mean rate of job mobility is low, as a robustness check of the linear probability
model, I also perform the analysis using a fixed effects logistic regression (where the dependent variable
in equation (13) becomes a logistic function of P (Mijt = 1)). Column (4) reports the estimates from
the fixed effects logit model that include the match fixed effects. For the fixed effects logit models, I
report the results in coefficients, or log odds ratios, which are interpreted as the difference in the log of
odd of the outcome associated with a unit change in the covariate. The standard errors are clustered
at the individual level across all specifications.
I find that within-job wage changes are negatively correlated with future job mobility (column 1).
For instance, a 10% decline in the current wage increases the probability of a job change in the next
period by 0.34 percentage points (column 1). The negative relationship between wage growth and
mobility is similar after allowing for individual fixed effects or match fixed effects (columns 2 and 3)
and nonlinearity in the regression (column 4). The fixed effects logit estimate from column 4 suggest
that a 10% increase in within-job wage growth decreases the log odds of job mobility by 0.098 times.30
29In addition to the variables included in the vector xit, in columns (1) and (2), I also control for the average wage paid
by firm j to worker i within the job spell that is observed in the sample period. I do not control for the wage level in the
immediate prior to wage change (lnwijt−1) in this regression. With transitory shocks, wages are mean reverting so a low
lagged wage (lnwijt−1) (that is due to a negative transitory shock) is more likely to associate with a high wage growth in
period t. This would generate a spurious negative relationship between wage growth and job mobility.
30The sample size of the fixed effects logit regression reflects the fact that identification of the coefficients is from job
spells that include at least one job change.
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The negative coefficient on within-job wage growth suggests that, holding all else equal (including
permanent wage, mean job-specific wage growth, worker’s age and tenure), workers who experience
small within-job wage growth are more likely to change jobs in the next following period. The evidence
presented above is informative of the potential important role of match-level shocks. Note that, because
part of the reported wage changes is measurement error, the estimated effect of within-job wage growth
is likely to be biased toward zero and the true empirical relation between wage growth and job mobility
would be stronger. One of the main tasks of estimating the structural model is to identify the within-job
wage variations that are due to measurement errors, match- and individual-level shocks, accounting for
endogenous job mobility and employment.
4 Identification and Estimation Strategy
For each education group, the structural model of job mobility is estimated jointly with the wage
process. Following Lentz (2009), the search costs are assumed to be exponential functions in offer arrival
rate: φe(λ) = Keλ
γ and φn(λ) = Knλ
γ , where γ > 1, and Ke and Kn are the search costs required to
receive an offer with certainty (i.e. λ = 1) during employment and unemployment, respectively.31 The
discount factor Γ is not estimated and held fixed at 0.97.32 In general, the flow utility of unemployment
cannot be separately identified from the cost of unemployment search (Eckstein and van den Berg,
2007). The flow utility of unemployment is fixed at the value of log unemployment benefit, where the
unemployment benefit is equal to 40% of the average wage in the sample (by education group).33 The
set of parameters to be estimated includes the wage equation parameters, (β0, c, δ, σ
2
u0 , σ
2
a0 , σ
2
η, σ
2
ζ , σ
2
v),
and the parameters that determine the rates of offer arrival and job destruction, (Ke,Kn, γ, ρ,).
4.1 Identification
In standard error-component models of wage dynamics, the variances of permanent and transitory
shocks are identified via autocovariances (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011). In this paper, identification
31These parametric restrictions ensure that the search cost function are increasing and convex.
32The annualized discount factor is 0.973 = 0.91. The value of the discount factor falls within the range of values
estimated from finite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models (Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Ferrall, 2012). I also numerically
evaluate the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative discount factors. The slope of the objective function is small around
small changes to the discount factor.
33Shimer (2005) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2011) set unemployment benefit equal to 41% of average wage,
which is equal to the average unemployment insurance replacement rates in the US.
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of all the structure based on the same standard moments is not feasible when there is endogenous
job mobility and employment decisions. For instance, autocovariances of wage changes conditional on
remaining on the same job and autocovariances of wage changes conditional on changing jobs would
not only depend on the wage process, but also on the rest of the parameters of the structural model.
Given that the wage shocks in the paper affect employment and mobility decisions, the estimates of
the variances of wage shocks, the worker and the match heterogeneity are biased if selection issues are
ignored.
The arguments for model identification are given below. The dynamic model of job mobility can
be formulated as a Roy model:
lnwijt = β0 + a
l
ijt + uit + vit
lnwij′t = β0 + a
o
ij′t + uit + vit
where as previously defined, lnwijt is the log wage for an individual i employed by current employer j
in period t and lnwij′t is the offered log wage from firm j
′. The offer acceptance rule is simply based
on the difference between the offered and the current match values:
J∗it = a
o
ij′t − alijt (14)
Jit =

1 if J∗it > 0
0 elsewhere
(15)
lnwijt is observed when Jit = 0 and lnwij′t is observed when Jit = 1. Given the distributional
assumptions of the error terms laid out in Section 2, we know that alijt is normally distributed con-
ditional on aijt−1 (since ηijt is normally distributed), with the mean of aijt−1 + c and variance of
σ2η, and a
o
ij′t is drawn from an independent normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ
2
a0 .
34
These distributional assumptions are sufficient to identify the Roy model (Heckman and Honore,
1990). Conditional on the match- and individual-level wages at the beginning of period t and search
costs functions, the following moment conditions using data from period t identify the parameters:
34Due to the log-normal distributional assumption, the offered wage distribution can be recovered from the truncated
distribution of observed wages (which satisfies the identification condition in Flinn and Heckman (1982)).
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P (Jit = 1), E(lnwijt|Jit = 0), E(lnwij′t|Jit = 1), var(lnwijt|Jit = 0), var(lnwij′t|Jit = 1). This gives
us five equations in five unknowns σ2ζ + σ
2
v , σ
2
η, σ
2
a0 , c, and β0 + δ. This identification argument can be
applied successively until the first period, when the distribution of match- and individual-level wages
can be derived analytically given the distributional assumptions.
The panel structure of the data facilitates the identification of the model. Moments based on
the autocovariances of wages are used to separately identify the variance of individual-level permanent
shocks (σ2ζ ) and the variance of measurement errors (σ
2
v). Covariances of wage changes and job mobility
help to identify the return to tenure separately from return to experience. For example, a high return
to tenure have differential impacts on within-job wage changes (E(∆ lnwijt|Mit = 0)) than between-job
wage changes (E(∆ lnwijt|Mit = 1)), whereas return to experience (δ) implies a parallel shift on wage
growth regardless of mobility. The labor market friction parameters can be identified using information
from wages and transition rates between labor market states (Flinn and Heckman, 1982). For instance,
cost of on-the-job search (λe) can be identified directly from the rates of transitions between jobs.
In general, neither λe nor λn affects the reservation wage for job mobility, but both will affect the
reservation wage for employment. Intuitively, if the rate of employment is low, a relatively untruncated
distribution of observed wages would imply a high cost of unemployment search relative to on-the-job
search, while a heavily truncated distribution would imply a high individual wage component.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
The model is estimated by the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM). Each decision period in the
model corresponds to one wave (four months) in the data. In each iteration in the parameter space,
computation of the simulated moments consists of nested loops. In the outer loop, the value functions
in the dynamic programming problem are computed backwards. In the inner loop, the moments are
simulated conditional on the value functions. The presence of match- and individual- heterogeneity
increases the state space. Online Appendix A describes the solution method to the value function in
detail. The method uses Monte Carlo integration and an interpolation method to approximate the
value function. The standard errors are computed using the formula described in Online Appendix B.
For each individual in each sample period, we observe job mobility, employment choices and log
wages if the individual is employed. The empirical moments include the means of job mobility, employ-
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ment, transition from employment into unemployment, and log wages in each sample period, and the
covariances of job mobility and log wage between any two sample periods. Since SIPP is a short panel,
it is typical that some workers have left-censored life-cycle histories when they are observed in the first
wave. For these workers, their first observed wages are endogenous, which leads to an initial condition
problem (Heckman, 1981). The initial condition problem is solved by simulating the model starting
from the beginning of the life cycle and evaluating the moments conditional on each individual’s first
observed life-cycle period τi.
35 The mean of elapsed job tenure when a worker is first observed in the
sample is added to the set of moments to match.36 Details of the estimation procedure are discussed
in Online Appendix B.
5 Estimation Results
Table 4 reports the estimated parameters of the structural model, separately for low-education and
high-education men. Relative to individual-level productivity risk, I find that wage risk at the worker-
firm match level is the dominating risk facing employed workers. For instance, among low-education
men, the variance of match-level shock (σ2η) is 0.005, whereas the variance of the person-level wage
shocks is 50 times smaller and insignificant from zero (σ2ζ = 0.0001).
37 The relative magnitude of
individual- vs. match-level shocks is further highlighted in terms of their contributions to overall wage
variance in Section 6.1.
Relative to the match- and individual-level permanent shocks, the variance of measurement errors
is indeed quite large. Consistent with findings from Gottschalk (2005) and Abowd and Stinson (2011),
I find that a substantial quarter-to-quarter variation in wages is due to measurement errors.38 Note
that, even though the variance of measurement errors is large in quarterly data, its contribution to the
variance of annual wage is relatively small compared to persistent shocks. When quarterly wages are
35Twenty simulations per individual are conducted. The simulations prior to period τi are discarded so that the
distribution of τi in the simulated sample matches the distribution in the real data.
36Recall from Section 3.1 that the SIPP contains information on the starting date of a worker’s present job when he is
first sampled. This information is used to construct the elapsed job tenure at the first interview date.
37The relative contribution of match-level risk and individual-level risk to the overall variance of wage growth depends
on the extent job mobility. In Section 6.1, I evaluate the relative importance of different types of risks in explaining the
overall variance of wage growth.
38As previously discussed in Section 2.1, in this paper, transitory shocks are interpreted as measurement errors. In the
estimation sample, the measurement error in wages may come from two sources: from reported wages for those who are
hourly paid and from reported earnings and/or hours for salary-paid workers.
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aggregated to annual wage, the variance of quarterly permanent shocks will be “amplified” more than
the variance of quarterly measurement errors.39
The estimated returns to tenure (c) is 0.2% per period among low-education men. Among high-
education men, the estimated return to tenure is slightly negative (at -0.4% per period). The small
estimates of return to tenure are in line with existing estimates that are able to account for selection
from job mobility and employment.40 Relative to the return to tenure estimate, the estimated return to
experience is positive and large. The return to experience is relatively higher among the high-educated
than the low-educated (2.4% vs. 1.1% per period). Relative to the return to tenure, match-level shocks
can generate large changes to match quality. For instance, for the low education group, a one standard
deviation match-level shock is equivalent to 7.2% of the match-level wages, whereas the mean return to
tenure is only 0.2% per period. Because workers are able to preserve good match shocks and move away
from bad match shocks by job mobility, match-level wage shocks and job mobility alone can generate
sufficient positive wage growth over time (see Section 6.1 for additional discussion).
The estimated initial heterogeneity of the individual wage component is larger than the match offer
heterogeneity. This gap is particularly large among the low-education individuals, which has important
implications for the sources of wage inequality (to discuss in the following section). Moreover, it also
suggests that the heterogeneity of individual productivity, on top of match heterogeneity, is essential
for the model to match both the extent of labor market transitions and wage dispersions.41 Among low-
education men, the estimated marginal cost of unemployment search is large relative to the marginal
cost of on-the-job search. This relationship is reversed among the high-education men, where the
marginal cost of on-the-job search is larger than that of unemployment search. Holding the marginal
benefit of search constant, the offer arrival rate among the high- (low-) education group tends to be
higher (lower) during unemployment than employment.
Figures 3 and 4 report the fit of the model to the sample of low-education and high-education men,
39As an illustration, in Online Appendix Section C, I show that the permanent-transitory variance ratio in annual data
can be six times as high as the ratio defined using quarterly data. The approximation is based on the canonical wage
process and Taylor approximation.
40For instance, Altonji and Williams (2005) report that their preferred estimate of return to tenure for the United States
is about 1 percent per annum. Note that this literature typically assumes that any shock to within-job wages is transitory
and does not relate to turnover behavior. The negative return to tenure among the high-educated coincides with Nagypal
(2005), who shows that a decreasing value of match quality over the job tenure is necessary to explain the high rate of
job turnovers in her data.
41Bils, Chang, Kim, and Hall (2009) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2011) show that match heterogeneity alone
is insufficient to produce both realistic wage dispersion and unemployment fluctuations at the same time.
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respectively.42 The simulated outcomes exhibit a reasonably good fit to the data. The simulations
capture essential features of the data including the average wage, job mobility and employment, as well
as the variance and autocovariance of wage and mobility. Although the model predicts employment
rate closely, it tends to overpredict the transition rate from employment to unemployment. Among
low-education men, the model also tends to underpredict the rate of job mobility.
Figure 5 plots the actual and predicted distributions of within- and between-job wage growth
of workers. The predicted wage growth does not include any measurement errors. Note that the
conditional wage distributions are not among the set of directly targeted moments and, therefore, they
provide additional evidence on the explanatory power of the model.43 Overall, the model is able to
predict the essential features of the wage distribution. For instance, the model correctly predicts that
the distribution of within-job wage growth has much less dispersion than the distribution of between-
job wage growth. Except for between-job wage growth among the high-educated, the peaks of the
densities are predicted reasonably well. However, the model underpredicts the fraction of job changes
with negative wage growth. Job mobility with wage cuts has been difficult to reconcile in the job-search
literature because, with a stationary wage policy, the worker chooses to switch jobs only if there exists
a job offering a higher wage.44 Although the model is successful in predicting some between-job wage
cuts (e.g. due to a cut in the person-component of wage or a negative latent match-level shock), the
measurement error is essential to explain large wage cuts between jobs.
5.1 Evidence from Alternative Wage Processes
5.1.1 Constant match quality within jobs
What happens if shocks to the worker-firm match are ignored? This corresponds to the assumption
made in Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) and Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2013), where the
worker’s mobility choice is solely based on the value of the initial match.45 Columns (1) and (3) of
42To evaluate the fitness of the model, I simulate 20 careers for each worker in the sample. For each worker, I then keep
8 periods within each career path according to the individual’s first observed life-cycle period τi.
43The actual distributions are based on the same data used to produce the top panel of Figure 2, except that I have
disaggregated the sample by education groups for comparisons with the model predictions.
44Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Dey and Flinn (2005) rationalize between-job wage cuts through an on-the-
job search with wage renegotiation between worker and current employer responding to outside offers. Hedonic models
provide another explanation. Many structural estimations of search model (e.g. Wolpin (1992)) assume that observed
wages contain measurement errors in order to produce positive likelihood of wage cut.
45Online Appendix D describes this alternative wage processes. The model is estimated using the same set of moments
as described in Section 4.
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Table 5 present the estimated parameters when the match values are held constant within jobs, for low-
and high-education men, respectively. When match-level shocks are ignored, there is a large increase in
the estimated variance of individual-level permanent shocks. For instance, among high-education men,
the variance of individual-level shocks increases tenfold (from 0.0002 to 0.002).46 A large proportion
of wage fluctuations that is specific to a worker-firm match has been identified as permanent shocks
that persist across all jobs. In addition to the differences in the estimated individual-level productivity
risk, the alternative model also has different implications in terms of the overall wage risk. In the
main model, the “true” wage risk is the sum of the variance of the person- and match-level shocks.
Under the alternative wage process, individual-level productivity risk is the only source of wage risk.
A comparison between the two models suggest that the true wage risk is a few times larger than the
wage risk implied from this alternative model. For instance, among low-education men, the true wage
risk is 0.0053 (=0.0052+0.0001), and the individual productivity risk implied by the alternative wage
process is 0.001.
Online Appendix Figures A1 and A2 show the fitness of the alternative model against the targeted
moments of low-education and high-education men, respectively. Relative to the benchmark model,
the alternative model fits the data less well in a few dimensions, although the alternative model also
provides a reasonable overall fit to data. For instance, the alternative model fits less well for the
covariance moments between job mobility and wage. For the low-education sample, the alternative
model overpredicts the rate of employment. For the high-education sample, the alternative model tends
to underpredict job mobility and overpredict the transition rate from employment to unemployment.
The alternative model fails to capture two important features of the data that are not among the
targeted moments used in estimation. Online Appendix Figure A3 plots the actual and predicted
distributions of within- and between-job wage growth of workers from the alternative wage process
(without measurement errors). Compared with the predicted distribution from the benchmark model
(Figure 5), the alternative model underpredicts the dispersion of within-job wage growth and between-
job wage cuts. For instance, among low-education men, the benchmark model implies that 14.3% of
job-job transitions are associated with a wage cut, whereas the fraction predicted by the constant match
quality model is 7%. In the constant match quality model, wage cuts can only be rationalized by a
46Note that, this estimated variance of individual-level wage shock is not directly comparable to Low, Meghir and
Pistaferri (2010), where they assume that the permanent shock occurs each quarter with probability 0.25.
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negative shock to individual productivity. The benchmark model can account for additional wage cuts
due to negative latent match-level shocks that affect job mobility but not are reflected in the pre-mobility
wages. Online Appendix Table A1 reports the data and model predictions for the (Pearson) correlation
coefficients between current within-job wage growth and job mobility in the immediate period. In the
data, the correlation coefficients are negative. This pattern is captured by the model including match-
level shocks (and measurement errors), but not by the alternative model with constant match quality.
When match quality is constant within job spells, within-job wage growth is due to measurement errors
and/or individual productivity shocks, neither of which affects job mobility decisions.
5.1.2 Exogenous Wage
In columns (2) and (4) of Table 5, I estimate a canonical wage process that has been frequently used to
estimate wage uncertainty in the labor economics and macroeconomics literature. In this model, wages
are exogenous; there is no match-specific wage component and no selection into/out of employment and
over jobs.47 Relative to the estimated permanent individual productivity risk allowing for endogenous
job mobility and employment, the variance of permanent shocks is larger (but still smaller than the true
wage risk defined above). For instance, among low-education men, the canonical model implies that the
variance of permanent shocks is 0.0016, whereas the alternative model accounting for endogenous job
mobility implies the variance of permanent shocks being 0.001. These results are qualitatively similar
to findings in Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), where they show that over half of the identified
permanent wage uncertainty stems from the worker’s endogenous job mobility choice.
Online Appendix Figures A4 and A5 show the fitness of the exogenous wage model against the
targeted moments of low-education and high-education men, respectively. Overall, the parsimonious
model assuming exogenous wage provides a reasonable fit to the variance of autocovariance of observed
wages in the data. Relative to the benchmark model, the main feature of the data that the exogenous
wage model fails to capture is that the variance of log wages is relatively flat in over time in the
data. Given that the permanent wage component follows a random walk, the implied variance of log
wages is strongly increasing over time. Online Appendix Figure A6 plots the actual and predicted
47Online Appendix D describes this alternative wage processes. This wage process resembles the wage process in
Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012), except that the transitory shocks are assumed to be i.i.d and interpreted as measurement
errors for better comparison with the benchmark model. Because job mobility and employment decision is ignored, the
model is estimated using the following moments (that is a subset of moments used in estimating the full model): the
variances/covariances of wages and mean wages.
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distributions of within- and between-job wage growth of workers from the exogenous wage process
(without measurement error). Because job mobility is not part of the model, the exogenous wage
process fails to capture an essential feature of the wage distribution–that the distribution of between-
job wage growth has large dispersion relative to the distribution of within-job wage growth.
6 Implications of the Model
6.1 Wage Growth, Inequality and Wage Risk in Early Careers
Using the estimated parameters in the model, I simulate 20 paths from beginning of the life cycle
for each individual in the sample. I use the simulated career histories to address the following three
questions. First, what are the relative contributions from the match- and the individual-level wages to
overall wage growth and inequality over time? Second, what is the the relative importance of different
types of risks on the variance of (residual) wage growth that is typically regarded as wage risk? Third,
how persistent are the (realized) match-level shocks after job mobility choices?
To address the first question, I decompose the mean and the variance of simulated population wages
over the first 30 periods (10 years) of the life cycle. Wages are defined as wage residuals, abstracting
from the permanent offered wage (β0) and any measurement errors. The top panel of Figure 6 examines
the age profile of mean wages, separately for low- and high-education men. The growth of the individual
component (E(uit)) is due to the positive return to work experience, which is larger among the high
educated than the low educated. Among low-education men, match-level wage growth is larger than
individual-level wage growth in the first few years in the labor market. After 10 years into the labor
market, match-level wage and individual-level wage are equally important in explaining wage growth
for the low education group. For the high-education men, individual-level wage (and therefore return
to experience) is the main driving force for overall wage growth for most of the early career. Given the
small estimates of return to tenure, the growth in the match component (E(aijt)) is due to job mobility
as workers climb up the job ladder. The existence of match-level shocks also pushes wage to grow
further, because only good shocks are kept and bad shocks could be alleviated through job changes.48
48Online Appendix Figure A7 shows that the cross-sectional distribution of incumbent match becomes increasingly
right-skewed as job tenure increases. When the extent of job-to-job transitions decreases as workers are further up the
job ladder, the growth of E(aijt) gradually slows down, generating a concave wage profile.
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The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows the contributions from match- and individual-level wages to
overall wage inequality over time. At the beginning of life, most wage inequality is from variation
in individual heterogeneity (i.e. individual’s general ability). As a worker accumulates labor market
experience, the contribution from the worker-firm match quickly rises as a result of the match shocks
and job-to-job transitions. For instance, among low-education men, after 10 years from the beginning of
life, the contribution from match-level wages eventually exceeds the contribution from the person-level
wages. This implies that differences in labor market histories are an important driving force behind
the increasing inequality in early careers.49
The model also generates a set of predictions regarding the contributions of different types of risks
on cross-sectional inequality. Suppose we have a set of individuals who are employed in both periods
t − 1 and t. We can decompose the inequality of wage growth between periods t − 1 and t into the
following four components:
var(∆ lnwijt) = var(∆aijt) + var(ζit)
= var(E(∆aijt|Mit))︸ ︷︷ ︸
between group variance
+ var(aijt − aij′t−1|Mit = 1)P (Mit = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
match heterogeneity
+ var(ηijt)P (Mit = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
match risk
+ var(ζit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity risk
(16)
The first term, between group variance, represents heterogeneity in the conditional mean match quality
with and without job mobility in period t. Match heterogeneity reflects heterogeneity in the offered
match quality conditional on moving.50 Match risk and productivity risk refer to uncertainty to match-
and individual-level wage component. The contribution from productivity risk is assumed invariant
to job mobility and hence independent from worker’s match-level wages in period t − 1. The relative
importance of match heterogeneity and match risk depends on the probability of job mobility and
henceforth worker’s reservation wage.51
Table 6 compares the contributions from different wage components on the overall variance of wage
49This result is similar to recent findings from Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011), who argue that policies aiming at
improving worker-firm matches are at least equally important as education policies aiming to improve initial conditions.
50As correctly noted in Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), part of this term also reflects uncertainty from outside offer
draws conditional on current match quality.
51The discussion in this section focuses on wage inequality without measurement errors. Measurement errors contribute
significantly to the variance of observed quarterly wage changes, although the contribution declines for the inequality of
annual wage changes (see Online Appendix C for a related discussion).
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growth for both low-education and high-education women. The results are reported at the end of year
1 (period 3), year 4 (period 12) and year 8 (period 24) of the model. At the end of year 1 of the model,
about half of the variation of wage growth is due to match-level wage shocks. The remaining half is
mainly explained by match heterogeneity and between-group variance. For instance, at the end of year
1, between-group variance accounts for 19.8% and 27.3% of the wage variance among low- and high-
education men, respectively. Individual-level productivity risk explains no more than 5% of the overall
variance of wage growth. As individuals gain labor market experiences, the wage variance explained
by the between-group variance declines significantly. The contribution from match heterogeneity also
declines substantially as a result of declining rate of job mobility. In the meantime, the contribution
from match-level risk increases substantially. In order of importance, the key factors explaining the
variance of wage growth at the end of year 8 of the model are match-level risk, match heterogeneity,
between-group variance, and individual-level productivity risk. At the end of year 8, match-level risk
can explain 81.9% of the overall wage variance for low-education men and 67.5% of the overall wage
variance for high-education men.
In the model, individual productivity shocks are permanent but the “ex-post” persistence of match-
level shocks depends on the rate of job mobility. It is possible to assess the “ex-post” persistence of
match-level shocks. A primitive analysis is provided as follows. Suppose a fraction of a match-level
shock is permanent and remaining fraction of the match-level shock is an i.i.d transitory shock. Let
∆ait ≡ ait − ait−1 = θηit + (1 − θ)∆ηit be the “realized” change in match-level wages between t and
t− 1, where θ is the fraction of the match-level shock that is ex-post permanent and, correspondingly,
1− θ is the fraction that is ex-post transitory. Then, the variance of match-level wage change is given
by var(∆ait) = ((1 − θ)2 + 1)σ2η. The fraction of match-level shocks that is permanent, θ, is given by
1−
√
var(∆ait)
σ2η
− 1. Note that, in the extreme case where there is no job mobility, θ = 1 and all of the
changes in match-level wage are permanent.
I find that, at the beginning of careers, match-level shocks are mostly transitory as workers are able
to find better outside offers quickly. A large fraction of match-level shocks are permanent for workers
with additional years of experience. Among low-education men, the fractions of match-level shocks that
are ex-post permanent at the end of year 2 (period 6), year 4 (period 12) and year 8 (period 24) are
39.1%, 56.8% and 69.3%, respectively. Among high-education men, the fractions of match-level shocks
30
that are ex-post permanent at the end of year 2 (period 6), year 4 (period 12) and year 8 (period 24)
are 14.7%, 37.3% and 46.3%, respectively.
6.2 Value of Job Mobility against Match-level Shocks
6.2.1 Definition and Measurement
Consider an individual i employed by firm j at the beginning of period t, just before the realization of
the wage shock (ηijt, ζit) for that period. Let a˜ijt(≡ aijt−1 + c) be the match-specific component prior
to the match-level wage shock in period t. I measure the value of job mobility as the degree to which
the individual is indifferent between particular realizations of a negative match-level shock. I define
the difference in continuation values due to the match-level shock as
∆it = V
e
t (a˜ijt, uit,Si)− Eη(V et (aijt, uit,Si|ηijt < 0)) (17)
where V et (a˜ijt, uit,Si) is the continuation value without any negative match-level shock, and
Eη(V
e
t (aijt, uit,Si|ηijt < 0)) is the mean continuation value following negative match-level shocks. ∆it
defines the welfare loss from the match-level wage shock. If ∆it = 0, then the individual is indifferent
between the state when the match-level shock arrives and when there is no match-level shock.52
To quantify the value of job mobility, I consider a modification to the environment that removes
job mobility as a channel of responding to the match-level wage shocks. Under the counterfactual
environment, the difference in continuation values due to match-level shocks is given by
∆̂it = V̂ et (a˜ijt, uit,Si)− Eη(V̂ et (aijt, uit,Si|ηijt < 0)) (18)
where V̂ et denotes the continuation value in the counterfactual environment. The counterfactual envi-
ronment disallows job mobility to respond to match-level shocks by holding the reservation wage for
job mobility at the level before the match-level shock is realized in every period of the model. Formally,
in every period t and for any draw of match-level shocks (ηijt) and outside offers (a
o
ij′t), the transition
52Relative to match-level wage shocks, I find that individual-level wage shocks has very small welfare impacts on average.
For this group of young male workers, the size of the individual-level wage shocks appears to be too small to have any
sizable impact on workers’ behavior and welfare.
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probability of match-level wages under the main model is given by
ft(aijt|ηijt, aijt−1) = ft(aijt|Mit, ηijt, aijt−1)ht(Mit|ηijt, aijt−1) (19)
where job mobility (Mit) can respond to match-level shocks (ηijt) via the h density. When job mobility
is removed as a channel of responding to the match-level wage shocks, the counterfactual distribution,
denoted by fˆ , is given by
fˆt(aijt|ηijt, aijt−1) = ft(aijt|Mit, ηijt, aijt−1)ht(Mit|0, aijt−1) (20)
where the likelihood of job mobility (the h density) is evaluated holding ηijt at zero. The density
function fˆ is used to define the value function in the counterfactual environment in each period.53
In the model, job mobility may reduce the welfare cost of match-level shocks via two inter-related
channels. Following the negative match shock, the worker’s reservation match becomes lower than
the reservation match without the shock. There is a set of wage offers that are acceptable after
the match-level shock, which would not have been acceptable without the match-level shock. In the
meantime, following negative match-level shocks, search intensity would increase to take advantage of
the increasing marginal benefit from job mobility. This increases the rate of offer arrival and further
strengthen the value of job mobility as a channel to reduce the welfare cost of match-level shocks. The
counterfactual environment thereby disallows job mobility to respond to match-level shocks falling in
this range whereas keeping the wage distribution conditional on job mobility unchanged.
The value of job mobility as a channel against negative match-level shocks can be defined as
ξit = 1− ∆it
∆̂it
(21)
where ξit is the proportional decrease to the average cost of negative match-level shocks due to the option
of job mobility. Note that ξit is heterogenous across workers because it depends on both match- and
53In this paper, the value of job mobility is defined in terms of how job mobility affects the welfare loss from the
match-level wage shock, not how job mobility improves the overall level of welfare. Even without match-level shocks,
the individual would be worse off if job mobility is removed because the individual has to forego outside offers that may
provide improvement in match quality. The primary focus of the paper is not the value of job mobility, per se, but the
component of that value that is related to the welfare effects of match-level wage shocks. This is similar to what has been
used in the literature to define the “insurance” value of individual actions against different types of shocks (e.g. Kaplan
(2012)).
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individual-level wages. If ξit is very close to zero, then the welfare loss from the negative match shock
is almost identical whether job mobility is allowed or not. In this case, job mobility is not a valuable
channel against the match-level shock. If ξit is close to one, then the welfare loss from the negative
match shock is small when job mobility is allowed (relative to the welfare loss when job mobility is
disallowed), which implies that job mobility is a highly valuable channel against the match-level shock.
6.2.2 The Value of Job Mobility
I use the estimated model to calculate the value of job mobility for individuals with four different
combinations of the individual- and match-level wages. I consider two types of individuals, uH (large
individual-level wage) and uL (small individual-level wage), who are matched to jobs with high (aH)
and low match quality (aL).54 Column (1) of Table 7 shows the value of job mobility (ξit), defined
in terms of how much the average cost of match-level shocks is reduced due to the availability of
job mobility (equation (21)). I find that job mobility can reduce the average cost of a match-level
shock, particularly for individuals whose match-level wages are low. For instance, for a low-education
individual with high individual-level wage but matched to a job with low match-level wage, job mobility
can reduce the average welfare cost of negative match-level shocks by as much as 63.8%. By contrast,
if the same individual worked for a job with a high match-level wage, then the value of job mobility
reduces substantially to 10.4%. Relative to workers whose match quality is high, workers located in
the bottom of the match quality distribution respond more to a given negative match shock.55
Holding match quality fixed, I find that workers whose individual productivity is high benefit more
from job mobility (in terms of reducing the average welfare cost of negative match-level shocks) than
workers whose individual productivity is low. For instance, among low-educated workers with the
same match quality at aL, the values of job mobility are 63.8% and 58.1% for workers with high-
and low-levels of individual productivity, respectively. The reason underlying this difference is because
of different reservation match values for employment: workers with high individual productivity have
lower reservation match quality for employment than workers with low individual productivity. For a
54The value of job mobility is computed at the end of year 4 (period 12) in the model. The high- and low-values of
individual- and match-level wages are defined at the 90th and 10th percentile of the corresponding distributions in period
12, respectively.
55Formally, this conclusion depends on the relative position of the match quality distribution and the offered match
distribution. For instance, Online Appendix Figure A7 shows, for individuals who are already at the top of the job ladder,
job mobility could be useful only for mitigating large negative match-level shocks. Endogenous search intensity would
strengthen the reaction to negative match-level shocks.
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given large and negative match-level shock, workers with low individual productivity are more likely
to quit for unemployment, thereby reducing the value of job mobility in reacting to this shock.
6.2.3 The Role of Search Costs and Unemployment Benefits
Columns (2) to (4) of Table 7 report how the value of job mobility might be affected by changes in the
model environment. I focus on the following three scenarios: (i) a one-third increase in the replacement
rate of unemployment benefits from 40% to 52% (column 2); (ii) a decrease in the marginal cost of
unemployment search (column 3) and (iii) a reduction in the marginal cost of on-the-job search (column
4).56
Both unemployment and job mobility are potential channels that workers may use to alleviate
negative match-level shocks. I find that policies that make unemployment more attractive reduces the
value of job mobility. For instance, the expansion of unemployment benefits reduces the value of job
mobility (column 2). The reduction is particularly large for the group of workers with low-individual
productivity and low match quality. Among low-education men, the value of job mobility for these
workers is reduced by 0.107, or 18.3% relative to the initial level. Among high-education men, the value
of job mobility for these workers is reduced by 0.118, or 20.4% relative to the initial level. A reduction in
the cost of unemployment search has the same qualitative effects on the value of job mobility (column
3), although the effects are small relative to the effects of the expansion in unemployment benefits.
Finally, column 4 shows that a decrease in the cost of on-the-job search increases the value of job
mobility and the increase is relatively more pronounced for individuals with low match quality.
To further explore the interaction between job mobility and unemployment benefit in alleviating
match-level shocks, Table 8 reports the welfare cost of match-level shocks under four different model
environments. The baseline column (column 1) reports the welfare cost of match-level shocks where
job mobility is removed from a channel of responding to the match-level wage shocks (∆̂it). Columns
(2) and (3) report the differential welfare cost after allowing for job mobility to respond to match-level
shocks (∆it− ∆̂it) and raising unemployment income, respectively. Column (4) reports the interaction
effects from adding both job mobility and raising unemployment income simultaneously. I find that an
increase in unemployment income alone can also reduce the welfare cost of match-level shocks without
56The reduction in the marginal cost of search is set such that the one-third increase in UI benefits combined with the
reduction in search costs implies a constant net flow utility when the rate of offer arrival is equal to one.
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job mobility (column 3). However, relative to job mobility (column 2), the reduction in the welfare
cost tends to be small. Therefore, unemployment is a useful channel to alleviate negative match-level
shocks but it is less valuable when compared to job mobility. The positive interaction effects between
job mobility and unemployment (column 4) implies that job mobility is less valuable when there is
higher unemployment income (adding columns 2 and 4) and raising unemployment income offers less
welfare gains in the presence of job mobility (adding columns 3 and 4). In fact, the value of higher
unemployment income is largely crowded out by job mobility (adding columns 3 and 4). Therefore, the
value of unemployment benefits against match-level shocks could be overstated without accounting for
endogenous job mobility response to shocks.57
This exercise, albeit speculative (e.g. because the partial equilibrium nature of the model), high-
lights the importance of distinguishing sources of wage shocks and modeling job mobility behavior
against match-level wage shocks. Policies that make unemployment benefits more generous increase
the reservation match quality for employment. Consequently, workers are incentivized to switch from
using job mobility to unemployment as a channel to react to a certain range of match-level shocks.
The crowding-out effects are especially pronounced among the group of workers with low-individual
productivity and low match quality.58 Relative to offering more generous unemployment income, poli-
cies that subsidize the cost of unemployment search have a relatively minor impact on the value of job
mobility.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I estimated a dynamic structural model of job mobility and employment jointly with
a stochastic wage process. I considered two sources of wage shocks, shocks at the worker-firm match
level and shocks at the individual level that persist across jobs, and modeled their effects on dynamic
individual behaviors such as employment, job mobility and job search efforts. The estimation results
suggest that wage risk at match level is the dominating type of risk facing employed individuals. In
order of importance, the key factors explaining the variance of wage growth at the end of year 8
57Unemployment benefits still have welfare value of insuring against other type of risk such as job destruction. Job
mobility is not a channel that workers can use to react upon layoff.
58For this group of workers, the threshold match value for employment is low and they are most likely to fall back to
unemployment for a wide range of negative match-level shocks.
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of the model are match-level risk, match heterogeneity, between-group variance, and individual-level
productivity risk. A larger fraction of match-level shocks are permanent for workers with more years
of experience. For instance, among low-education men, the fractions of match-level shocks that are
ex-post permanent at the end of year 2 and year 8 are 39.1% and 69.3%, respectively.
I showed that job mobility is a valuable channel in response to the match-level wage shocks in
early careers. The value is particularly large for individuals at the bottom of the job ladder (holding
individual productivity fixed) and individuals of low productivity (holding the match quality fixed).
The interaction effects between job mobility and unemployment implies that job mobility is less valu-
able when unemployment income is high and raising unemployment income has less welfare gains
in the presence of job mobility. The interaction effects are strongest for the group of workers with
low-individual productivity and low match quality. For instance, among low-education men, a more
generous unemployment income reduces the value of job mobility for these workers by 18.3% relative to
the initial level. Unemployment income also provides some value in terms of reducing the welfare cost
of match-level shocks, but only when job mobility is removed from a channel of responding to these
shocks.
Recovering the true wage risk facing individuals from their choices is complex. While this paper
takes a step to separate match-level risk from individual-level risk by modeling job mobility, it has
several limitations that can be extended in future research. First, the modeling of job mobility decisions
is simple and highly stylized. For instance, jobs could differ in other aspects besides match quality.
Modeling transitions across jobs that differ explicitly in wage risk, return to tenure, or hours of work is
desirable and left for future research. Each extension would add another state variable in the model and
require a careful specification of the preference structure. Second, in the current paper, productivity of
a worker is known to the firm in each period. Empirical work on the implications of learning for wage
dynamics within and across jobs and for job mobility is a promising area for future research. This will
provide some structural interpretation of the match-level wage shocks that are considered important in
this paper (Farber and Gibbons, 1996). Finally, an important avenue for future research is to analyze
the relation between job mobility and other channels that workers can rely on in response to labor
market risks, and to quantify their relative value in reacting against different types of shocks.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, SIPP 1996
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Demographics
Age 27.40 2.46
White 0.72 0.45
Some college or more 0.55 0.50
Metropolitan 0.83 0.38
Own a house 0.49 0.50
Married 0.54 0.50
Labor market variables
Wages 11.62 5.35
Hours of work per week 42.11 11.32
Proportion of job-job transition 0.10 0.30
Elapsed job duration in the first observation period 5.45 5.74
Total number of observations 13544
Note: Wages are deflated using monthly CPI-Urban (CPI=1 in 1996:1) and averaged over a four-month period (per wave).
Table 2: Total Number of Job Changes (in percentages), by Potential Experience
Number of job changes
0 1 2 3 4+
Quartiles of initial
life-cycle period
Less than 25th (1-4) 45.0 31.7 13.7 5.1 4.4
25-50 (7-10) 54.9 24.0 14.4 4.9 1.9
50-75 (13-16) 59.2 25.1 11.8 2.9 1.0
More than 75th (19-22) 69.2 20.2 8.2 2.4 0.0
Total 56.4 25.6 12.2 3.9 1.95
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Table 3: Job Mobility and Wage Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Within-job wage growth -0.034** -0.035** -0.028** -0.983**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.443)
Within-job average wage -0.082*** -0.717*** - -
(0.009) (0.090)
Fixed effects included No Individual Match Match
Model OLS FE FE FE-Logit
Observations 8638 8638 8638 1743
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Within-job wage growth is measured in period t. The dependent variable is a
job change indicator in period t+ 1 (equals to one if a job change occurs). All regressions control for year dummies and
a quadratic in age. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by person. See Section 3 for details.
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Table 4: Estimated Model Parameters
Low-education High-education
(1) (2)
Labor market shocks
σ2η × 10 0.052 0.039
(0.008) (0.007)
σ2ζ × 10 0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.010)
σ2v 0.029 0.053
(0.002) (0.003)
ρ 0.020 0.008
(0.000) (0.000)
Mean offered wage
c 0.002 -0.004
(0.000) (0.001)
δ 0.011 0.024
(0.000) (0.001)
β0 1.918 2.019
(0.016) (0.022)
Heterogeneity
σ2a0 0.010 0.013
(0.001) (0.003)
σ2u0 0.053 0.058
(0.005) (0.013)
Search cost
Ke 1.214 2.443
(0.224) (0.599)
Kn 2.307 1.837
(0.134) (0.122)
γ 3.715 3.653
(0.225) (0.243)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. σ2η, σ
2
ζ and σ
2
v are, respectively, the variances of match- and person-level shocks,
and measurement errors. c and δ are the return to tenure and return to experience, respectively. σ2a0 is the heterogeneity
in the offered match values. σ2u0 is the heterogeneity in the person-component of wages at the start of work life. Ke, Kn
and γ are parameters relating to the search costs. ρ is the layoff probability. β0 is the constant term in the offered log
wage equation.
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Table 5: Estimated Model Parameters: Alternative Wage Processes
Low education High education
Constant match Exogenous wage Constant match Exogenous wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor market shocks
σ2ζ × 10 0.010 0.016 0.022 0.028
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010)
σ2v 0.028 0.036 0.050 0.053
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ρ 0.012 - 0.013 -
(0.000) (0.000)
Mean offered wage
δ 0.007 0.017 0.020 0.024
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
β0 1.891 1.973 2.070 2.118
(0.013) (0.025) (0.021) (0.026)
Heterogeneity
σ2a0 0.047 - 0.019 -
(0.008) (0.002)
σ2u0 0.063 0.062 0.065 0.057
(0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.016)
Search cost
Ke 1.408 - 2.532 -
(0.323) (0.487)
Kn 2.598 - 1.416 -
(0.172) (0.099)
γ 3.740 - 3.948 -
(0.148) (0.301)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. σ2ζ and σ
2
v are, respectively, the variances of person-level shocks and measurement
errors. c and δ are the return to tenure and return to experience, respectively. σ2a0 is the heterogeneity in the offered
match values. σ2u0 is the heterogeneity in the person-component of wages at the start of work life. Ke, Kn and γ are
parameters relating to the search costs. ρ is the layoff probability. β0 is the constant term in the offered log wage equation.
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Table 6: Decomposing the Variance of Wage Growth in Early Careers
Model period (four-month)
3 12 24
Decomposition: low-education men
Between-group variance 19.8% 8.7% 6.3%
Match heterogeneity 22.2% 15.9% 9.6%
Match risk 56.3% 73.3% 81.9%
Individual productivity risk 1.6% 2.1% 2.2%
Decomposition: high-education men
Between-group variance 27.3% 17.7% 13.0%
Match heterogeneity 23.1% 16.6% 15.1%
Match risk 46.5% 61.5% 67.5%
Individual productivity risk 3.2% 4.1% 4.5%
Mean rate of job mobility
Low-education men 0.152 0.084 0.062
High-education men 0.133 0.093 0.062
Table 7: Value of Job Mobility in Response to Match-level Wage Shocks
Wage components Expand Reduce cost of search
(individual, match) Baseline UI Unemployment On-the-job
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Low-education men
uL, aL 0.581 -0.107 -0.008 0.023
uH , aL 0.638 -0.001 0.000 0.019
uL, aH 0.097 -0.011 -0.001 0.005
uH , aH 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.004
Panel B: High-education men
uL, aL 0.579 -0.118 -0.016 0.012
uH , aL 0.675 -0.017 -0.001 0.009
uL, aH 0.166 -0.013 -0.003 0.004
uH , aH 0.179 -0.001 0.000 0.003
Note: uL (aL) and uH (aH) are, respectively, the individual (match) component of wage at the 10th and 90th percentiles
in period 12 of the model. Columns (2) to (4) report differences relative to column (1).
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Table 8: Welfare Cost of Match-level Wage Shocks
Wage components Job Expand Interaction effects
(individual, match) Baseline mobility UI JM+UI expansion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Low-education men
uL, aL 0.538 -0.313 -0.110 0.109
uH , aL 0.622 -0.396 -0.002 0.002
uL, aH 0.991 -0.097 -0.012 0.012
uH , aH 0.999 -0.104 0.000 0.000
Panel B: High-education men
uL, aL 0.442 -0.256 -0.097 0.097
uH , aL 0.575 -0.388 -0.029 0.028
uL, aH 0.980 -0.163 -0.015 0.015
uH , aH 0.995 -0.179 -0.002 0.002
Note: uL (aL) and uH (aH) are, respectively, the individual (match) component of wage at the 10th and 90th percentiles
in period 12 of the model. Columns (2) to (3) report differences relative to column (1). Column (4) reports the interaction
effects of job mobility and UI expansion. (2)+(4) refers to the value of job mobility in the presence of UI expansion.
(3)+(4) refers to the value of additional unemployment benefits in the presence of job mobility. See Section 6.2 for details.
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Figure 1: Match-specific Wages and Job Mobility
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Figure 2: Distributions of Within- and Between-job Log Wage Changes
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Note: The top two figures show the distribution of real log wage growth between waves within (left) and between jobs
(right). The means (standard deviations) are 0.018(0.24) and 0.052(0.45), respectively. The bottom two figures show
the distribution of nominal log wage growth between waves within (left) and between jobs (right). The means (standard
deviations) are 0.024(0.24) and 0.059(0.45), respectively.
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Figure 3: Model Fit by Period: Low-education Men
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Figure 4: Model Fit by Period: High-education Men
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Figure 5: Actual and Predicted Within- and Between-job Log Wage Changes
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Figure 6: Decomposing Wage Growth and Inequality
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Online Appendix to “Wage Risk and the Value of Job Mobility in
Early Employment Careers”, by Kai Liu. October 2017
A Approximating the Value Function
I choose to specify a terminal value function at time T0 and solve the model backwards from T0. The
assumption at t = T0 is that job mobility and employment decision cease and there are no match-level
and individual-level wage shocks from T0 + 1 until the end of work life T . I set T = 50 periods and
T0 = 35 periods (one period corresponds to four months in the data).
The value function is solved at each combination of unobserved heterogeneity (αi). The com-
putational burden from solving the value function arises primarily from the continuous and serially
correlated state variables uit and aijt. The difficulty is that, in order to evaluate value function at t, it
is necessary to compute the value function for every possible value of aijt+1 and uit+1 which may arise
in t+ 1. The number of possible values grows exponentially with t, making computation quickly infea-
sible. To circumvent this issue, I use an interpolation method developed in Bound, Stinebrickner, and
Waidmann (2010). The method involves two steps. In the first step, I determine the range of possible
values of aijt and uit which could arise from simulations used to approximate the value function and
evaluate the moments in every period t = 1, . . . , T0. In the second step, the value function is solved
backwards. At each time t, the value function is evaluated at 30 equally spaced grid point anijt and
unit. To calculate the value function at each grid point at time t, I need to calculate the value function
at t + 1 for possible values of aijt+1 and uit+1. These values will not correspond to the grid points in
t+ 1 in general. At these points, the value function is evaluated by interpolation. For instance, each of
the possible value functions at aijt+1 is approximated by interpolating between the two value functions
associated with two surrounding grid points an−1ijt+1 and a
n
ijt+1.
B Estimation by the Method of Simulated Moments
For any two sample periods p1 and p2 such that 1 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ P (where P denotes the last sample
period), the vector of simulated moments is:
g(θ; p1, p2) = s(p1, p2)− 1
N
N∑
i=1
f(θ; τi, p1, p2) (1)
where N is the number of workers in the panel, s is a vector of empirical moments implied by the
data, and 1N
∑N
i=1 f(θ; τi, p1, p2) is a vector of corresponding moments predicted by the model.
1 The
empirical moments include the following:
E(Mip2 |Pip2 = 1), E(lnwip2 |Pip2 = 1), E(Pip2), E(Pip2 = 0|Pi,p2−1 = 1),
cov(lnwip1 , lnwip2 |Pip1 = 1, Pip2 = 1), cov(Mip1 ,Mip2 |Pip1 = 1, Pip2 = 1),
cov(lnwip1 ,Mip2 |Pip1 = 1, Pip2 = 1), cov(Mip1 , lnwip2 |Pip1 = 1, Pip2 = 1)
The function f cannot be computed analytically because, in the presence of endogenous selection
on the match process, the distribution of the state variables at any given life period does not carry an
1It is important to note that the predicted moment f depends on τi (life-cycle period in the first sampling period). τi,
p1 and p2 map into two unique life periods t1 and t2.
1
analytical form. I choose to approximate it by its simulated counterpart:
fˆ(θ; τi, p1, p2) =
1
S
S∑
s=1
f(θ; νˆs, τi, p1, p2)→ f(θ; τi, p1, p2) (2)
where {νˆs}s=Ss=1 is a sequence of random variables that are identically and independently distributed. It
consists of sequences of draws of job offers, shocks to match- and individual-specific components from
the beginning of the life cycle, and a vector of person-specific unobserved heterogeneity Si drawn at the
beginning of each simulated path.2 With νˆ, the model is able to simulate S employment histories for
each individual from the beginning of the life cycle. Twenty simulations per individual are conducted.
The observations prior to period τi are discarded such that the distribution of τi in the simulated
sample matches the distribution in the real data. The mean of elapsed job tenure when a worker is first
observed in the sample is added to the set of moments to match. The predicted moments are evaluated
using simulated data containing N × S simulated paths, each of which spans P periods.
Let g(θ) be a vector consisting g(θ; p1, p2) at all possible combinations of p1 and p2. The size of
vector g(θ) is M × 1. The goal of the MSM estimation is to find θ which minimizes:
g(θ)′g(θ) (3)
To obtain standard errors, I define conformably the individual vector, gi and the corresponding
residuals, ei = gi − g(θ). The variance-covariance matrix of g(θ) is3:
V =
N∑
i=1
(eie
′
i) (4)
and the standard errors are given by
var(θ̂) = (G′G)−1G′V G(G′G)−1 (5)
where G = ∂f(θ)∂θ |θ=θ̂ is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the estimated parameters θ̂.4
C Quarterly Shocks and Dynamics of Annual Wages
The wage process in this paper is estimated using quarterly (four months) data. Most of the existing
estimates of wage risks use annual data. In this Section, I derive the relation between the variance of
quarterly wage shocks and the variance of annual wage shocks, using a canonical wage process specified
on quarterly data.
In year τ , denote the first four-month period as t, the second four-month period as t + 1, and the
third four-month period as t + 2. For a given individual i, the measured growth in log annual wage
2The normally distributed random variables are constructed through the inversion method. That is, I first draw a
vector of random variables z from a uniform (0,1) distribution. Evaluating the inverse of cumulative normal distribution
F−1(z) yields a vector of normally distributed random variables. The uniform draws z are held fixed and independent of
model parameters. This guarantees that the MSM objective function varies only with respect to changes in parameters
of interest.
3Each individual in our data set contributes to only a subset of the moments, because, for example, wages and job
mobility are only defined for workers. The notation in the equation below leaves it implicit.
4Also see Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) for a discussion about standard
errors in this type of models.
2
(∆ logwiτ ) can be written as:
5
∆ logwiτ = log(wit + wit+1 + wit+2)− log(wit−1 + wit−2 + wit−3) (6)
Suppose that the quarterly wage evolves stochastically with serially uncorrelated transitory com-
ponent and a random walk permanent component, where
lnwit = β0 + uit + vit (7)
uit+1 = uit + ζit+1 (8)
where ζ and v are quarterly permanent and transitory shocks, respectively. They are assumed i.i.d
with means equal to zero. Given the wage process, the change in log annual wage can be written as a
function of quarterly wage shocks:
∆ logwiτ = log(
t+2∑
a=t
e
∑a
s=t−3 ζis+via)− log(
t−1∑
a=t−3
e
∑a
s=t−3 ζis+via) ≡ g(θ) (9)
where θ = ({ζs}t+2s=t−3, {vs}t+2s=t−3). I approximate g(θ) by multivariate Taylor expansion around E(θ) =
0. Then,
var(g(θ)) =
N∑
i=1
g′i(0)
2var(θi) + 2
∑
i>j
g′i(0)g
′
j(0)cov(θi, θj) (10)
where N is the length of the vector θ, θi is the i
th element in θ, and g′i(0) =
∂g(θ)
∂θi
|θ1=0,...,θN=0. By
assumption, cov(θi, θj) = 0 for all i 6= j. Then, the variance of annual wage growth is
var(∆ logwiτ ) =
19
9
σ2ζ +
6
9
σ2v (11)
If the same wage process is imposed on annual data, the variance of annual wage growth is
var(∆ logwiτ ) = σ̂2ζ + 2σ̂
2
v (12)
where σ̂2ζ and σ̂
2
v are the variance of annual permanent and transitory wage shocks. From equations
(11) and (12), we obtain the relationship between quarterly wage shocks and annual wage shocks as
σ̂2ζ =
19
9
σ2ζ (13)
σ̂2v =
1
3
σ2v (14)
Therefore, in terms of contributions to the variance of annual wage shocks, the variance of quarterly
permanent shocks have a larger weight (by a factor over 6) than the variance of quarterly transitory
shocks.
5For simplicity, I assume that hours of work do not vary within a given year.
3
D Alternative Models of Wage Processes
Constant Match Quality. In this alternative model of wage process, match quality is held fixed
within each job spell. The life-cycle wage process for the individual i employed by firm j in period t is:
ln w˜ijt = lnwijt + vit (15)
lnwijt = β0 + aijt + uit (16)
aijt+1 =
{
aijt, if no job change between t and t+ 1
aoij′t+1, if there is job change between t and t+ 1
uit+1 = uit + δ + ζit+1 (17)
aoij′t+1 ∼ N(0, σ2a0), ui0 ∼ N(0, σ2u0), ζit ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ) (18)
E(vit) = 0, var(vit) = σ
2
v (19)
Exogenous Wages. In this alternative model of wage process, wages are exogenous because selection
into/out of employment and different jobs is ignored. The life-cycle wage process for the individual i
employed by firm j in period t is:6
ln w˜ijt = β0 + uit + vit (20)
uit+1 = uit + δ + ζit+1 (21)
ui0 ∼ N(0, σ2u0), ζit ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ) (22)
E(vit) = 0, var(vit) = σ
2
v (23)
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Table A1: Actual and Implied Correlation Coefficient between Within-job Wage Growth and Job
Mobility
Model predictions
Data Match shock Constant Match
Low-education men -0.033 -0.049 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.854)
High-education men -0.031 -0.024 -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.291)
Note: This table reports the actual and predicted (Pearson) correlation coefficient between within-job wage growth in
period t and job mobility in period t+ 1. P-values are in parentheses.
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Figure A1: Model Fit by Period: Constant Match Quality and Low-education Men
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Figure A2: Model Fit by Period: Constant Match Quality and High-education Men
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Figure A3: Actual and Predicted Within- and Between-job Log Wage Changes: Constant Match
Quality
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Figure A4: Model Fit by Period: Exogenous Wage and Low-education Men
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Figure A5: Model Fit by Period: Exogenous Wage and High-education Men
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Figure A6: Actual and Predicted Within- and Between-job Log Wage Changes: Exogenous Wage
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Figure A7: Distributions of Incumbent Match and Offered Match, by Completed Job Tenure
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